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This study explores empirically the effects of corporate income taxes on the incentive to invest in Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) activities. We estimate th  relation between CSR ratings and firm-specific corporate effective 
tax rates for a large sample of non-financial listed companies from 15 European countries during 2006-2016. By 
employing an instrumental variable approach, we find that average effective tax rates (EATR) are negatively 
correlated with CSR ratings. Our findings are also consistent under additional tests and robustness checks. We, 
therefore, can provide suggestive evidence that corporate taxation discourages corporate socially responsible 
behaviour. At the same time, in a tax policy perspective, our analysis suggests how countries could encourage 
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Do income taxes affect corporate social responsibility (CSR)? This is the research question examined in this study 
with the aim to shed light on the role played by public policy and in particular tax policy in promoting corporate 
socially responsible behaviours.
A large literature emphasizes the importance of public policies on socially responsible value creation and CSR 
activities in order to improve social welfare (Albareda et al., 2007, 2008; Sarkar, 2008; Steuerer et al., 2012; 
Midttun et al., 2015). Over the last decade, governments have joined other stakeholders in assuming a relevant role 
as drivers of corporate social responsibility and adopting public sector roles in strengthening CSR (Fox et al. 2002). 
At the start of the century, these governmental initiatives converged with the actions of different international 
organizations such as the UN Global Compact and the European Commission, both of which began to promote and 
endorse CSR, recognizing that the role of public policy initiatives was key in encouraging corporate socially 
responsible behaviours. The connection between the firm's CSR activities and the public sector was recognized as a 
special channel to achieve sustainable and long-term development during the World Bank conference on "Public 
Policy and Corporate Social Responsibility" (Petkoski and Twose, 2003). One of the more concrete 
recommendations concerned the provision of tax-incentives to facilitate the corporate to social welfare spillovers. 
On the same line, a survey on recommended public policies to achieve sustainable practices suggested a "tax break" 
for CSR firms (Steuerer, 2010). 
In the CSR economic literature, different factors are found to explain the socially responsible behaviour of 
companies (Liang and Renneboog 2018). However, little is known about the effects of corporate tax policy on CSR 
activities. Theoretical and empirical literature mainly investigated the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance, 
finding interesting but ambiguous results (Goerke, 2018; Huseynov and Klamm 2012; Davis et al., 2016). Recently, 
Lòpez-Gonzàlez et al. (2019) find that social and environmental performance is negatively related with tax 
avoidance so that firms with a greater socially responsible performance show a lower tax saving practices. 
Trying to fill this gap our study aims at investigating the effects of corporate income taxes on the incentive to invest 
in CSR activities. Compared to previous tax literature, we develop a different perspective of analysis. We focus on 
the role played by corporate income taxes in promoting or discouraging CSR investments. To this aim, following 
the literature on the effects of corporate taxes on investment (e.g. Auerbach and Hassett, 1992, 2002; Djankov et 
al., 2010; Hassett and Hubbard, 2002), we adopt the microeconomic framework of Devereux and Griffith (2003) to 
calculate forward-looking effective tax rates on investment. Following the triple bottom line (TBL) approach 
(Elkington 1994) we consider the CSR as all corporate practices affecting the environmental, social and governance 
sphere. The higher (lower) the environmental, social and governance corporate commitment, the higher (lower) the 
corporate social responsibility activities. For our purpose, the TBL approach to CSR is the most appropriate 
framework to take into account not only the total corporate sustainability commitment, but also both environmental 
and social production externalities. 
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In this context, we estimate the relation between CSR ratings and firm-specific corporate effective average tax rates 
(EATRs) for a large sample of non-financial listed companies from 15 European countries during 2006-2016. We 
find that EATRs are negatively correlated in a statistically significant way with CSR ratings. We, therefore, can 
provide suggestive evidence that corporate taxation discourages CSR activities and that conversely it can be used as 
an instrument to boost CSR investment.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it speaks to the general literature on the determinants 
of CSR and adds to the understanding of the role played by corporate taxes in promoting socially responsible 
behaviour. Our research speaks directly to the nature of the causal path from corporate income taxes to CSR, which 
is unique in the CSR literature. Second, in a tax policy perspective, it suggests how countries could incentivize 
through the tax system the corporate provision of public goods. To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to 
provide genuine causal and empirical evidence about the influence of tax policy on CSR and our data clearly 
document such a relationship. Our findings contribute to the CSR literature by documenting an important and 
previously unexamined driver of CSR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical framework and our 
research hypothesis; in Section 3 we illustrate the methodology and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 discusses the results and conclud s the paper.
2. Theoretical framework and research hypothesis
As is well known, CSR spans multiple dimensions of firm behaviour. It captures a firm's effort to address various 
externalities that it generates in the process of pursuing profit maximization (Tirole 2001). These externalities are 
not entirely internalized by shareholders (Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet, 2015). Theoretical and empirical literature 
shows that firms voluntary produce (impure) public goods or correct negative externalities jointly with their main 
task to provide private goods, independent of legal benchmarks (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012; Besley and 
Ghatak, 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2009). In the literature, the view of CSR activities as a firm’s investment has 
been discussed since its foundation. Specifically, it has been argued (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012) that CSR 
may constitute, rather than a pure form of corporate expenditure (i.e. it simply is a static cost parameter), a special 
form of investment into innovation. As such CSR investments are actions that address environmental or social 
impact, while at the same time improving a firm’s competitiveness (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) 
in a long-term perspective (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Baron 2001). 
The common explanation for why companies invest in CSR is that doing so enhances profitability and firm value, a 
relationship often referred to as “doing well by doing good” (Renneboog et. al., 2008, 2011; Guenster et al., 2011; 
Deng et al., 2013; Flammer, 2015; Krueger, 2015). Jiao (2010) argues that a positive effect of CSR on corporate 
performance is consistent with the view that CSR represents an investment in intangible assets (such as reputation 
Page 4 of 23
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/csrem































































and human capital), which contribute to enhancing firms’ competitiveness1. In a more recent contribute Sun and 
Gunia (2018) explore the link between economic resources and CSR. They stress the importance of the firm's 
condition on CSR activities and the positive relationship between the increasing of economic resources and CSR 
investments. 
In the CSR literature little is known about the effects of tax policy on corporate socially responsible behaviours. 
Theoretical and empirical literature mainly questioned whether corporate tax payments and CSR act as 
complements or substitutes (Goerke, 2018). Empirical research suggests competing predictions about the 
relationship between tax payments and CSR (Laguir et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2017). Some 
studies find a positive relationship (Huseynov and Klamm 2012), while others (Davis et al., 2016; Lòpez-Gonzàlez 
et al., 2019) find results of opposite sign.
Following the view that CSR represents an investment in intangible assets, the most appropriate framework to 
analyse the effects of taxes on CSR investments is offered by the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate 
taxation. If firms regard CSR as one of several investment options, then changes in taxes and then in profitability 
could influence CSR investments much as these changes influence other investment decisions. The linkage 
between corporate taxation and firm economic performance has received persistent attention in both the academic 
literature and policy debates. It is well understood that corporate taxation can have large effects on firms’ 
investment decisions. Corporate taxes impinge directly on the incentive to accumulate capital and to invest in 
innovation (Feldstein et al., 1983; Auerbach, 1983, 2002; King and Fullerton, 1984; Auerbach and Hassett, 1992, 
2002; Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1996; Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer, 2010; Hassett and 
Hubbard, 2002; Hines, 2001, 2007). Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) point 
out that corporate taxes affect investment by reducing current period cash flow available to fund it.
In the empirical literature, most studies employ the cost of capital approach dating back to Jorgenson (1963), Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967), and King (1974), and further developed by Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003). This method 
exploits variation of the tax-adjusted user cost over time or across sectors to detect the impact on investment 
choices. In the Devereux and Griffith’s framework (2003) a well-established methodology has been developed to 
calculate forward-looking effective tax rates on the basis of prospective, or hypothetical, investment projects. The 
advantage of this approach is that it allows for cross-country comparisons of the effect of taxes on the incentive to 
invest (Spengel et al. 2018).
Following the view that CSR represents an investment and according to the corporate tax literature, we formulate 
the following research hypotheses:
H1: The relation between corporate effective tax rates and CSR, Environmental and Social ratings is negative
1 A negative effect of CSR on performance is consistent with the view that CSR represents private benefits (e.g., respect, job 
security, public image) that managers extract at the expense of shareholders.
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We randomly selected a sample of 236 European listed non-financial companies, according to the Thomson 
Reuters Business Classification (TRBC), from 2006 to 2016 and the environmental (E), social (S) and ESG score 
components from Thomson Reuters’s ASSET4, as a proxy of the level of CSR (see e.g Liang and Renneboog 2017, 
Arouri et al 2019). The CSR score used in our sample is a weighted average of ESG scores ranged from 0 to 100 
(highest CSR level). Our dataset covers non-financial companies, from 15 countries (Great Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, France, Finland, Spain, Denmark, Germany, 
Belgium). ASSET 4 provides data about ESG aggregated score and single Environmental (ENV), Social (SOC) and 
Governance (GOV) factors. However, in order to test our hypothesis, we focused only on ESG aggregated score (as 
a proxy of firm CSR level), E and S pillars. Following Thomson Reuters, the ESG score measure is a combination 
of 10 categories composing the three single pillars which reflects the company’s CSR performance and 
commitment. All single score can take a value from 0 (worst corporate performance) to 100 (best corporate 
performance) and, according to Thomson Reuters database, is composed on three sub-categories, which, 
aggregated, form the single pillar. In order to t st our hypothesis, we calculated the CSR, ENV and SOC pillars as 
suggested by the last available methodology by Thomson Reuters (Thomson Reuters ESG scores, February 2019). 
More precisely, the calculation of ESG is composed by the following weights and components: the 34% of ENV 
score, the 35.5 % of SOC score and the 30.5 % of GOV score. The ENV score is composed of "Resource use" (11 
%) score, the "Emission" score (12%) and the "Innovation" score (11%). The SOC score is based on the 
"Workforce" score (16 %), the "Human Rights" score (4.5 %) , the "Community" score (8%) and the "Product 
Responsibility" score (7%). 
3.1 Taxation measures
We follow the Devereux and Griffith’s framework (2003), which allows computing firm-specific effective tax 
rates. In this context, a firm at time t increases its capital stock by one unit; at time t + 1, this investment is worth (1 
− δ) (1 + π) where δ is the depreciation rate and π the inflation rate. The investment return at time t + 1 can be 
expressed as (p + δ) (1 + π), where p is the real financial rate of return of the investment. In the absence of taxation 
the net present value of the economic rent produced by the investment (R*) will be independent from the source of 
finance (equity, debt) and can be expressed as follows: 
R*=(p-r)/(1+r) (1)
where r measures the real interest market rate. 
The introduction of the tax system changes this result and the post-tax net present value will depend on how the 
investment is financed (retained earnings, issues of new shares, debt financing). The empirical analysis of this 
Page 6 of 23
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/csrem































































paper uses the average effective tax rates (EATRs). EATRs analyse how the tax system influences binary choices 
decisions of the company, for instance, the choice a firm faces when deciding whether or not to undertake a 
specific type of investment. Specifically, EATRs measure the average tax burden on an investment giving a 
predetermined rate of profitability. EATRs are calculated as the difference between the pre-tax net present value of 
investment R* (Equation 1) and its after-tax net present value (R) over the pre-tax rate of return on capital, defined 
by the ratio between the rate of profitability p and (1 + r), where r is the market interest rate: 
EATR=(R*-R)/p/(1+r) (2)
In our analysis, we estimated effective average corporate tax rates (ETRs) based on Spengel et al. (2018). We 
calculated the firm-specific effective tax rate, weighting the tax rate on the firm’s specific debt to equity ratio and 
industry (based on information available in our companies data-set).
3.3 Control Variables
We include a set of control variables to account for the relationship between EATR and CSR (Liang and 
Renneboog 2018; Ferrel et al., 2016). We include two different sets of control variables: at corporate and macro 
levels. The set of corporate controls include: the liquidity ratio (LIQ) calculated as the ratio between total cash on 
total asset, the return on asset (ROA) calculated as the earnings before interest, tax and depreciation on the total 
asset ratio, the size (SIZE) calculated as the natural logarithm of total asset, the leverage (LEV) computed as the 
total debt to total asset ratio, and the capital expenditure scaled on total asset (CAPEX). All corporate control 
variables come from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database and are based on our calculation as explained before. 
According to the literature, the CSR investing could be influenced by other sovereign and macro-economic 
conditions. To this aim we include also the following sovereign variables: the KOF index of globalization, the GDP 
pro capita (GDP PC) provided by the IMF database, the government effectiveness index (GOV EFF) to control for 
the perceptions of the quality of public services (World Bank database) , the index of the political constraints 
(POLCON), that take into account the strength of political limits (provided by the Wharton University of 
Pennsylvania), the index of investor protection (INVEST PROT) (World Bank database), the economic freedom 
index (ECO FREE) (World Bank database) and the control corruption index (CONTR CORR) (World Bank 
database). Finally, we control also for year and industry and firm fixed effect, clustering the standard error at the 
firm level (Ferrell et al 2016) by performing different econometric models. Following Iacobucci et al (2015), we 
yearly and country (year country) centered the GOV EFF and ECO FREE index, in order to reduce the correlation 
problems among regressors (corr > 0.46).
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According to the literature that finds adverse effects of corporate income taxes on investment (Hassett and 
Hubbard, 2002; Hassett and Glenn, 2002; Djankov et al., 2010; Ohrn, 2018), our prediction is that corporate taxes 
can discourage socially responsible activities, reflected by CSR ratings. The recent literature on CSR investments 
(Soytas et al 2019) casts doubt on the possibility of endogeneity problems between CSR and firm's financial 
performance. Lee et al. (2015) find a statistically positive relationship between corporate sustainability and 
financial performance, while Lourenco et al. (2012) stress the reverse causal link. Endogeneity concerns are raised 
also in the literature on CSR and tax avoidance (Lopez-Gonzalez et al., 2018, Huseynov and Klamm 2012). For our 
purpose, endogeneity could rise by both reverse causalities (EATR - CSR) and by the correlation between the 
independent variables and error term. In order to avoid endogeneity problems, we employ the Instrumental 
Variables (IV) (Ferrell et al 2016) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Sheikh, 2018; Sheikh 2019; Zolotoy 
et al 2019) technique with year, industry fixed effect and cluster at the firm level (Ferrel et al 2016; Zolotoy et al 
2019). One of the reasons we adopt the IV-GMM is that by run the IV-GMM the model parameters are estimated in 
a single step, improving the estimation efficiency (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) while in the classic IV 2sls this 
does not happen. In line with the literature (see e.g Woolridge 2015; Minnick et al 2017; Lin et al., 2011; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009) we instrument the potentially endogenous variable (the EATRs) on its own lagged values in our 
baseline model (table 3). Table 3 shows the second stage of the IV GMM by controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of our target variable (EATRs). According to the previous studies (Minnick et al 2017, Coglianese et 
al 2017, Woolridge 2015, Keen and Syed 2006), the lagged values of tax rates could be considered as valid 
instruments of current tax rates, especially due to its high correlation with the current tax rates. However, the IV 
GMM method needs further econometric tests, such as the Cragg-Donald first stage f-statistic, the Sargan’s p and 
Hansen’s J values, to correctly stress the use of good and unbiased instruments (Durbin, 1954; Hausman, 1978; 
Wu, 1973). As shown in Table 3, all these three tests confirm the adequate choice of instrumental variable 
involved.  
However, following the literature (Ferrel et al 2016), endogeneity bias could also arise from other regressors, such 
as the SIZE, LIQ, ROA, LEV, CAPEX (Table 4). To test the robustness of our results, in Table 4 we show the 
second stage of IV GMM by instrumenting not only our target variable (EATRs) but also the SIZE, LIQ, ROA, 
LEV, CAPEX with the within-sample arithmetic means of each our five corporate independent variables by 
country, industry and year (country-industry-year average) (Table 4). The use of industry peers’ average financial 
policies (SIZE, LIQ, LEV, CAPEX) and performances (ROA) as IVs is in line with the literature showing that a 
firm’s financial strategy is influenced by the performance and policies of its peer firms (Leary and Roberts, 2014) 
and that a firm’s CSR practice is affected by its peer firms’ financial policies through channels other than 
influencing its financial policies. Following the literature, the peer effects are the leading determinants of capital 
structure determination (e.g., Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 2014), and corporate investment decisions (Foucalt 
and Fresard, 2014 ). In line with studies mentioned before, and as shown in table A2, our instruments satisfy the 
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rule of thumb assessing the quality of instrumental variables: the high correlation with the instrumented variables 
(robust instruments), shown by high values (>16.38) of the Cragg-Donald first stage f-statistic (Table A2). Table 
A2 shows the first-stage of IV-GMM methods, to stress the individual validity of IVs employed in second- stage of 
IV-GMM (Table 3 and Table 4). The benefit of running an IV GMM comes from the capacity to control for 
endogeneity, providing greater consistency, explanatory power and general efficiency. Moreover, we control for 
industry and time fixed effects, which mitigate concerns that unobservable firm characteristics or time trends could 
drive our results. As of last robustness checks, we employ a panel fixed effect regression model with the same 
corporate effective tax rates (EATRs), showing that our results hold also without the use of IVs (Table 5)
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive results
Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation of the variables. SOC, ENV and CSR scores are our dependent 
variables with average values (82, 79 and 76 per cent respectively). These results show a first picture of the way the 
social dimension is developed among European firms.
The correlation matrix (Table 2) shows a low correlation among variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
4.2 Corporate effective taxation and CSR 
Table 3, 4 and 5 report the results of the second sage of the IV GMM regression.  The EATR is strongly negatively 
correlated with CSR (-0.716 p<0.01), ENV (-0.354 p<0.01) and SOC (-0.380 p<0.01) score.  Our results support 
H1, letting us stress a negative relationship between corporate income taxes and corporate sustainable 
performances. More precisely, a one standard deviation increase of EATRs reduce by 1.52 % (-0.380*4) (table 3) 
the ability of firms to develop "sustainable products", respect "human rights", the "local community" and the 
"workforce" involved in the value creation processes.  An increase of one standard deviation of EATRs discourages 
the "emission" reduction, the "resource use" valorisation, and "environmental innovation" by 1.41 % and 2.9% 
(table 3) of the total ability of firms of being socially responsible and play an active role on the Socially 
development goals (SDG) achievement.  Looking at the controls, firms with higher CSR ratings are larger firms 
with a higher return on asset, located in countries that are more globalized (as captured by the KOF globalization 
index, ECO FREE and INVEST PROT) and better governed (as showed by GOV EFF, CONTR CORR). All these 
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corporate controls variables are in line with the literature on CSR determinants (Liang and Renneboog 2018; 
Boubakri et al., 2019; Sun and Gunia 2018). 
Nevertheless, the IV approach requires several post-estimations tests, such as the Sargan test, the Hansen test and 
the Cragg-Donald f-test statistics to be considered as a valid method (Woolridge, 2015, Durbin, 1954; Hausman, 
1978; Wu, 1973). As shown in table 3 and 4, the Sargan's p-value is >0.1 for all CSR, ENV and SOC score, 
allowing us to do not reject the Sargan's null hypothesis and to successfully consider all variables as exogenous. 
The second post-estimation step is the overidentification test (Hansen's j), which for values greater than 0.1 stress 
the correct specification of the model, the validity of instrument adopted and the goodness of specified structural 
equation. The third check regards the validity of the instruments used. As shown in Table A2, the Cragg-Donald f-
test statistics is always higher than the critical value of 16.38, with P-values smaller than 0.01 in all specifications.
Table 3: Main results of second-stage IV-GMM of ETRs and CSR, ENV and SOC
As additional robustness check (Table 5) we run a panel fixed effect regression; the negative relationship between 
EATRs and all three dependent variables is confirmed.
As shown in Table 3, 4 and 5, the EATRs are always in a statistically significant way negatively correlated with 
CSR, ENV and SOC scores. More precisely, the stronger negative impact of tax rates is that related to the ability of 
firms to pursue sustainable practices (CSR) maximizing shareholder wealth as well as achieving broader societal 
goals. Moreover, our baseline analysis (Table 3 and Table 4) by disentangling the CSR score into two of its three 
components (E, S and G), allows us to stress that the SOC pillar is the component which is most discouraged by 
higher EATRs.
Table 4: Alternative second-stage IV GMM of ETRs and CSR, ENV and SOC
Table 5: Fixed effect regression results of EATRs, CSR, ENV and SOC score
5. Conclusions
We explored the impact of corporate taxes in Europe during the period 2006-2016 on the level of corporate social 
responsibility for non-financial listed companies, by regressing the firm-specific effective tax rates on the CSR 
score. We run different econometrics tests showing that the effective average corporate taxes strongly reduce the 
CSR level of European companies. To assess the impact of EATR on corporate sustainable practices, our study 
focuses also on the firm’s environmental and social performances, because they provide a standard example of 
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economic externalities (Chen et al 2018). We, therefore, can provide suggestive evidence that corporate taxation 
discourages CSR activities. At the same time, we also stress the connection between CSR disclosure and 
institutional framework (Chen et al. 2018; Ferrel et al 2016). 
The economic literature (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012) argues that only if governments fail to deliver optimal 
levels of public good, will CSR be potentially efficient; however, it outlines conditions under which CSR may 
produce higher social welfare gains than public or other private provision channels. In a tax policy perspective, our 
analysis also suggests how countries could incentivize through the tax system the corporate provision of public 
goods. The above results support that government highly focused on promoting sustainable development and 
corporate to social welfare spillover effects (Albareda et al., 2007, 2008; Midttun et al., 2015) should reduce the 
effective corporate taxation (Steuerer 2010), also through tax incentives along the well-known model of tax credit 
on R&D investment. 
Our paper contributes to the debate on CSR and sustainable development in three ways. Firstly, it empirically 
shows the negative impact of corporate taxes on CSR engagement, suggesting how to improve social welfare by 
encouraging corporate welfare. Secondly, it shows how corporate taxes differently affect the social (SOC) and 
environmental (ENV) dimension of a firm’s sustainable investing. Thirdly, we stress a public policy strategy 
through which European countries, by reducing corporate effective taxation, could encourage corporate disclosure 
and social responsibility of both large and small and medium companies.
Nonetheless, our results are subject to certain limitations. First, the main limitation corresponds to the CSR 
measure, which is provided by only one provider (Thomson Reuters). Although this measure has been used in 
several previous studies (e.g., Ferrel et al 2016; Liang and Renneboog 2017), future research could try to examine 
our research questions by using alternative environmental and social measures. Second, our sample of analysis is 
restricted to specific countries and for the period 2006–2016. Future studies could reinforce the results by enlarging 
the period and the sample of analysis to additional countries.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Nuber of Observations Mean Std.Dev.
CSR 2101 76 16
ENV 2101 79 21
SOC 2101 82 18
EATR 2279 24 4
LIQ 2309 0.06 0.06
ROA 2318 0.13 0.08
SIZE 2326 17 1
LEV 2324 0.27 0.15
CAPEX 2318 0.04 0.03
KOF 1931 87 2
GDP PC 2366 45962 11394
GOV EFF 2234 1.55 0.36
POLCON 2267 0.48 0.08
CONTR CORR 2264 1.66 0.49
INVEST PROT 2242 6 1
ECO FREE 1843 71 5.64
Table 2: Correlation Matrix













ROA -0.081 -0.180 1
CAPEX 0.040 0.031 0.271 1
LEV 0.009 0.242 -0.101 0.051 1
LIQ -0.081 -0.021 0.080 -0.060 -0.210 1
SIZE 0.350 0.290 -0.301 0.050 0.170 -0.220 1
KOF -0.021 -0.291 0.080 -0.110 -0.220 0.061 -0.231 1
GDP PC -0.181 -0.360 0.110 -0.040 -0.090 0.002 -0.131 0.340 1
GOV 
EFF 0.010 -0.061 -0.030 -0.020 0.020 -0.040 -0.031 -0.020 0.030 1
POLCON -0.10 -0.220 -0.010 -0.070 -0.040 -0.030 0.031 0.201 0.240 0.050 1
ECO 
FREE -0.070 0.141 0.007 0.070 0.013 0.061 -0.051 -0.051 0.130 0.030 -0.021 1
INVEST 
PROT 0.090 -0.311 0.161 0.070 0.011 -0.020 -0.301 0.241 -0.170 0.050 -0.450 -0.022 1
CONTR 
CORR 0.021 0.140 0.020 0.060 -0.011 -0.060 0.012 -0.091 0.160 0.020 0.101 0.161 -0.190 1
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Table 3: Main results of second-stage IV-GMM of ETRs and CSR, ENV and SOC
 (1) (2) (3)
CSR ENV SOC
    
EATR -0.716*** -0.354*** -0.380***
(0.060) (0.069) (0.060)
ROA 1.985 -3.806 11.27**
(6.249) (5.802) (5.258)
CAPEX -10.79 15.56 -22.35**
(7.664) (11.56) (11.18)
LEV 1.892 -8.723*** -0.837
(2.701) (2.187) (2.613)
LIQ 2.347 -1.246 2.673
(5.438) (5.276) (5.930)
SIZE 4.232*** 6.192*** 5.574***
(0.260) (0.412) (0.329)
KOF 0.637*** 0.691*** 0.239
(0.130) (0.164) (0.166)
GDP PC -.0003*** -.0002*** -.0003***
(.00002) (.00005) (.00002)
GOV EFF 2.933** 6.235*** 4.421**
(1.322) (1.906) (1.919)
POLCON -21.95*** -14.19*** -15.71***
(2.519) (2.497) (2.322)
ECO FREE 0.143 -0.145 0.0247
(0.111) (0.143) (0.106)
INVEST PROT -0.500* 0.340 0.160
(0.259) (0.352) (0.318)
CONTR CORR 4.168** 3.465 7.576***
(1.678) (2.113) (1.613)
Constant -15.19 -60.28*** -8.263
(14.40) (18.08) (16.03)
Sargan's p 0.45 1.00 1.00
Hansen's j 0.14 0.57 0.17
Cragg Donald F-Statistic 165.50*** 165.50*** 165.50***
Industry fe yes yes yes
Year fe yes yes yes
Observations 1,434 1,434 1,434
R-squared 0.185 0.221 0.205
N = 1,434 firm‐year observations. Clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 
0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.0
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Table 4: Alternative second-stage IV GMM of ETRs and CSR, ENV and SOC
(1) (2) (3)
CSR ENV SOC
EATR -0.721*** -0.475*** -0.609***
(0.090) (0.104) (0.057)
CAPEX -9.054 13.78 -26.31**
(8.216) (13.44) (11.65)
LIQ 11.19* -3.188 -0.467
(5.801) (7.371) (5.635)
ROA -4.234 -10.35 14.81**
(5.623) (7.151) (5.795)
LEV 3.765 -9.131*** 0.543
(2.673) (2.908) (2.719)
SIZE 5.026*** 5.827*** 5.370***
(0.309) (0.465) (0.300)
KOF 0.752*** 0.844*** 0.529***
(0.163) (0.199) (0.166)
GDP PC -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0004***
(.00005) (.00005) (.0003)
GOV EFF 3.557** 6.733*** 3.611
(1.492) (2.033) (2.209)
POLCON -16.68*** -10.44** -14.11***
(3.591) (4.821) (3.520)
ECO FREE 0.0691 -0.0396 0.127
(0.119) (0.159) (0.124)
INVEST PROT 0.547* -0.970** -1.378***
(0.310) (0.389) (0.256)
CONTR CORR 6.253*** 0.687 6.094***
(1.812) (2.217) (1.812)






















R-squared 0.194 0.221 0.206
N = 1,434 firm‐year observations. Clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 
0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.0
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Table 5: Fixed effect regression results of EATRs, CSR, ENV and SOC score
(1) (2) (3)
CSR ENV SOC
EATR -0.697*** -0.891*** -0.742***
(0.164) (0.212) (0.181)
ROA 5.553 2.467 8.027
(8.404) (12.16) (8.459)
CAPEX -3.627 4.466 12.91
(9.269) (11.97) (12.24)
LEV 2.626 6.918 1.161
(5.375) (7.320) (5.893)
LIQ -5.095 -11.81 -4.781
(6.053) (10.32) (7.419)
SIZE 7.063*** 7.954*** 5.830***
(1.392) (2.247) (1.488)
KOF -0.345 -0.337 -0.319
(0.434) (0.609) (0.447)
GDP PC -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0002***
(.00005) (.00008) (.00007)
GOV EFF 4.664* 3.921 4.413
(2.583) (3.032) (2.929)
POLCON -20.21*** -14.73*** -13.37***
(3.801) (3.613) (3.953)
ECO FREE -0.240 0.0337 -0.214
(0.180) (0.242) (0.229)
INVEST PROT 1.320*** 1.560*** 1.442***
(0.420) (0.493) (0.459)
CONTR CORR 2.583 -0.520 4.285
(3.296) (3.544) (3.767)


















R-squared 0.67 0.63 0.61
N = 1,434 firm‐year observations. Clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *p < 
0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.0
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Variables Measures Description Data sources
Corporate Social Responsibility score CSR Thomson Reuters ESG Score is an overall 
company score based on the self-reported 




Environmental score ENV Thomson Reuters Environmental Score is based 
on a weighted average of Resource use score, 




Social score SOC Thomson Reuters social Score is based on a 
weigthed average of 
Workforce score, Human rights score, 




                 Effective Average tax rate EATR Country Average corporate tax rate weighted on 
the firm’s specific debt to equity ratio and 
industry
Own estimations on the 
basis of Spengel, et. al. 
(2018) data
Return on Asset ROA Measured as the pre-tax income, scaled by the 
total of asset
Own estimation based on 
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 database




Size of firm SIZE Measured as the natural logarithm of total asset
Own estimation based on 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream measures
Leverage LEV Measured as the total debt to total asset ratio
Own estimation based on 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream measures
Capital expenditure                CAPEX Measured as the capital expenditure to total asset 
ratio
Own estimation based on 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream measures
GDP pro capita GDP PC Measured as the total amount of country GDP pro capita
IMF Database
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Political constraints POLCON Is a Country index provided to identify 
underlying political structures and measure their 
ability to develop credible policy commitments
Wharton University of 
Pennsylvania
Economic freedom index ECO FREE Is a Country index that capture the degree of 
country economic freedom
World Bank
Control Corruption CONTR CORR Is a Worldwide Governance indicator, that 
capture the perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption
World Bank
Government effectiveness GOV EFF The Government Effectiveness index captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies
World Bank
Index of globalization KOF Is a Country index that capture the rate of 
globalization in Countries around the world
Swiss economic Institute 
ETH Zurich
Investor protection INVEST PROT Is a Country index that measure the strength by 
which the investors are protected from frauds and 
from financial default
World Bank
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Industry peer ROA 0.994***
(0.013)
Industry peer CAPEX 0.987***
(0.0199)
Industry peer LEV 1.001***
(0.0164)
Industry peer LIQ 0.997***
(0.0132)






























Observations 1,465 1,495 1,497 1,501 1,495
R-squared 0.934 0.911 0.851 0.903 0.885
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